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Abstract 
Expectation of both sales and profit acts as an incentive structure for complementors, such as software vender, record 
rebels, TV program studio and so on. Because this expectation changes along with the product lifecycle progress, 
complementors’ behavior tends to be undesirable for multi-sided platform operators. Thus multi-sided platform operators 
have to manage the quality and variety of complements developed by external companies in order to sustain their sound 
ecosystem and to keep them growing. Otherwise the moral hazard problems between multi-sided platform operators and 
complementors cause the market failure of multi-sided platform to destroy their ecosystem. In this paper, I illustrated the 
mechanism of the moral hazard problem occurring firstly. Secondly I discussed the methodology to control the 
complementors’ product development investment especially focusing on the price structure of platforms. At the last 
section I drew the limitation of the price structure control method from the discussion. 
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1. Introduction 
There is a similarity among four types of multi-sided platforms (later, MSPs): Software platforms such as 
OS of PC, Match making platforms such as securities trading places, Transaction platforms such as credit 
cards and Audience platforms such as search portal sites of the Internet. The similarity is that the platform 
operator offers the right to access to the platform simultaneously to two or more user groups [1]. Rochet and 
Tirole [2][3] [4] defined the multi-sidedness of market or platform as below. 
 
Consider a platform charging per-interaction charges ࢻ࡮ and ࢻࡿ to the buyer and seller sides. The market 
for interactions between the two sides is one-sided if the volume V of transactions realized on the platform 
depends only on the aggregate price level 
ࢻ ൌ ࢻ࡮ ൅ ࢻࡿ, 
i.e., is insensitive to reallocations of this total price a between the buyer and the seller. If by contrast V 
varies with ࢻ࡮ while ࢻ is kept constant, the market is said to be two-sided. 
 
According to the simple model which Rochet and Tirole developed, the ecosystem surrounding an MSP is 
constituted of three players such as a platform operator, supply side users and demand side users (Fig. 1). The 
utility of a platform for demand side users can be divided into two parts: the one is derived from quality and 
features of platform goods themselves, and the other is derived from the scales and quality of complements 
provided by supply side users such as application software of PC. Katz and Shapiro [5] defined such a 
customer's utility as Ƚ ൅ Ⱦ. The first half portion (Ƚ) of a customer utility is a non-network utility depending 
on the platform goods themselves, that includes the product function, durability, reliability, a brand image, etc. 
On the other hand, the second half of the utility (Ⱦ) depends on a network effect of complements. This is 
expressed by multiplying variety of complements (x)  by marginal utility of complements (Ⱦ). 
 
Fig. 1.The structures of Multi-sided Platforms 
Therefore, the platform operator needs to manage properly the investment of product development by the 
supply side users, often called the complementors, in order to increase the utility of a platform for the demand 
side users. Otherwise, failure of a multi-sided market is caused by the moral hazard problem between the 
platform operator and the complementors. Thus former leading platforms such as Nintendo Super Family 
Computer System are sometimes overcome by next leading platforms such as Sony Computer 
Entertainments’, hereafter SCE’s, PlayStation.  
Literatures about MSPs mentioned that various types of market failures might exist throughout the 
lifecycle of each MSP. Atari shock might be one of the most famous examples of these kinds of market 
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failures. Why do multi-sided platform operators face complementors’ undesirable behavior? The purpose of 
this paper is to explicate the mechanism that forces complementors to behave as destroyers of the ecosystem 
which they belong to, by focusing on the complementors’ expected sales change and marketing cost changes. 
Thus, with the progress of the life cycle, a platform operator often faces an action of the complementary 
producer which is not desirable for development of an ecosystem. In the main subject, this management 
subject is modeled as a problem of a moral hazard and an incentive, and how to manage their investment 
move in the desirable direction is examined. 
2. Literature about failure of multi-sided market 
Matsumura, Kurimoto and Kobayashi [6] divide the network effects into two parts by time-axis. They call 
the network effects generated by existing complements “cumulative effects” and the network effects 
generated by the expected variety of complements that will be launched in future “expectation effects”. From 
the demonstrative research on Japanese video game industry, they found that only expectation effects can be 
testified. 
If we premise the predominance of the expectation effect over the cumulative effect, we can understand 
easily that some leading multi-sided platforms, once held the de-facto standard position, are often defeated by 
new entries. This is because the uncertainty on multi-sided platforms’ utilities that would lead the failure of 
market exists always. In this section, I’ll summarize the situations that would lead market failures along with 
each phase of product lifecycle [7], [8]. However I’ll eliminate the decline stage from analysis because there 
are almost the same problems in this phase as in the introduction stage. 
At the introduction stage, the uncertainty that the other side users would entry the market affluently exists 
for both side users: complementors and end users. This leads the externality that both side users reluctant to 
enter the multi-sided platform ([1], [2], [3], [9]). Thus multi-sided platform operators have to build 
asymmetric price structures or introduce enough complements by themselves in order to induce one side first. 
At the growth stage, the adverse selection such as “Bad money drives out good” is pointed out (Nakada 
[10]). Atari shock is a well-known case of this. In 1980, the major U.S. videogame console provider, Atari, 
went bankrupt and this led the bankruptcies of 90% of software companies. It is said that the failure of 
software quality control by Atari caused this shock. In order to avoid this adverse selection problem, the 
platform operator also needs to manage the quality of the complements developed by external companies so 
that the diversity and quality of complements can be maintained at a suitable state [1]. 
At the maturity stage, the crisis of market failure caused by mannerism of complements that is led by 
intensive competition is pointed out [11]. In his demonstrative research on PDA (Personal Digital Assist) 
industry, he revealed the U curve relation between complementors amount and innovation amount that is 
defined as the number of new version software launched in a period. At first, the increase of complementors 
has positive influence on the price, and complementors’ innovative investment is encouraged. But if the entry 
of complementors is exceeded, the price of complements declines and their investment behavior becomes 
conservative. Thus multi-sided platform operators have to regulate the entry of complementors at moderate 
level and enhance the new transaction between complementors and end users in order to prevent the 
mannerism of complements. 
As I summarized above, platform operators face various types of market failure crisis throughout all the 
stages of product lifecycle. They have to control the complementors’ behavior to avoid this. 
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3. Modeling the multi-sided market failure accompanying a moral hazard problem  
Since private information exists after the deals between a client (principal), such as a platform operator, 
and a representative (agent), such as a complementor, a moral hazard problem occurs, as we can see on the 
Atari’s experiences. A moral hazard is a problem that principal can’t earn desirable result because there are 
conflicts between principal’s interests and agent’s interests. 
From the result of Boudreaux’s survey, we can confirm that the change of complementors’ competition 
level sometimes enhances the innovation of complements, and sometimes restrains the innovation of that. 
Then, I will propose a model by which we can discuss the cause of three types of moral hazard problems 
totally, through the two step investigation shown below by stereotyping the complementors’ investment as 
quality-oriented product investment and diversification-oriented, sometimes low quality, product investment.  
• Specifying which type of investment a complementor chooses under what kind of situation, by interpreting 
complementors’ expectation of both sales and profit as incentive structures.  
• Discussing that the change of the competition level, accompanying the progress of a product life cycle 
stage, has what kind of influence on the complementors’ forecast of earnings.  
3.1. Complementors’ investment behavior and product lifecycle 
A complementor has two types of strategic options at every product lifecycle stage of complements market. 
For the simplification, I define one type as mass-product type project that guarantees products’ quality, and 
another type as niche-product type project that tends to put much value on diversification rather than quality. 
The meanings of both types of projects differ in every product lifecycle stage respectively. 
In the introduction stage, the mass-product type project means a development project for the existing 
innovators. Because the innovators’ technical literacy is sufficient, technology-oriented ventures can access 
end users easily. On the other hand, the niche-product type project of this time means a trial-and-error type 
complements development project that aims at the further new exploitation. It is difficult for the technical-
oriented ventures to access the majority whose technological literacy tends to be low. 
In the growth stage, the mass-product type project launches an improved version of the existing hot-selling 
product by which complementors aim to expand the market size under the growing market. On the other hand, 
the niche-product type project borrows the idea of the existing hot-selling product, and means introducing a 
similar worse version. Since the distribution channels and information channels of complements are 
fragmented and many complements have also entered in this period, end users can’t tell what complements 
suit for them and what complements’ quality are sufficient before the purchase. 
In the maturity stage, the mass-product type project means launching a rehashed version of the existing 
hot-selling product. Because many complementors and distributers of that have already been screened through 
competition in this period, the surviving major complementors’ developing cost and marketing cost tend to 
surge. Because the saturation of technology occurs simultaneously, complementors tend not to introduce 
rookie titles but sequel titles of former hot-selling products. On the other hand niche-product type project in 
this period means launching new variation of complements or new category of complements in order to 
capture new segments of end users or to expand the use of platform. But under the stiffened market structure, 
this kind of project’s expected sales and profit would be very low. 
3.2. Condition of each type project is selected by complementors 
Complementors will invest in the project that meets the incentive compatibility and the individual 
rationality condition simultaneously. The incentive compatibility is the condition that the profit of agent 
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earned from desirable behavior for principal is bigger than that from undesirable behavior for principal. The 
individual rationality condition is that the profit of agent earned from contracting this principal is bigger than 
that from contracting another principal.  
The utility (U) of a project defined as a variable affected by both the sales (S) of a project and the gains or 
profit (G) of a project is expressed below, 
ܷሺܵǡ ܩሻ ൌ ߙܵ ൅ ߚܩ; Įand ȕ are arbitrary coefficients, respectively. (1) 
Because a company will invest in more profitable and bigger sales projects than the others, I define the 
complementors’ utility as a liner function of sales and profit.  
3.2.1. The conditions of incentive compatibility and individual rationality 
The complementors have to invest a large amount in development of mass-products (Fm: Fixed cost of 
Mass products). Because the quality of this kind of products has to surpass that of existing products, its 
possibility of good result on sales will exceed that of niche-products. “p” stands for this possibility. On the 
other hand niche-product development needs a smaller amount of investment (Fn: Fixed cost of niche-
products) than mass-product development. Because there is no antecedent product like this, complementors 
don’t have to seek over-quality. However the possibility of good result on sales is relatively low. “q” stands 
for this kind of possibility. Thus, there is a relation such as “1>p>q>0” between “p” and “q”. 
In this paper, Sg (Sales of Good result) stands for the sales of successful project and Sb (Sales of bad 
result) stands for the sales of failed project. If we set “r (0r1)” as the ratio of variable cost for sakes, we can 
express the “G: profit” of successful project as “ሺͳ െ ݎሻܵ݃ െ ܨ݉”, and also that of failed project as “ሺͳ െ
ݎሻܾܵ െ ܨ݊”. Thus we can express the utility of mass-product project as, 
 ൌ ݌ሾߙܵ݃ ൅ ߚሼሺͳ െ ݎሻܵ݃ െ ܨ݉ሽሿ ൅ ሺͳ െ ݌ሻሾߙܾܵ ൅ ߚሼሺͳ െ ݎሻܾܵ െ ܨ݉ሽሿ (2) 
and the utility of niche-products as,  
 ൌ ݍሾߙܵ݃ ൅ ߚሼሺͳ െ ݎሻܵ݃ െ ܨ݊ሽሿ ൅ ሺͳ െ ݍሻሾߙܾܵ ൅ ߚሼሺͳ െ ݎሻܾܵ െ ܨ݊ሽሿ (3) 
Now we can define the condition of incentive compatibility for mass-product development here as, 
ܷ݊ ൏ ܷ݉ ֞ ܾܵ ൏ ܵ݃ െ ߚሺܨ݉ െ ܨ݊ሻ ሺ݌ െ ݍሻሼߙ ൅ ሺͳ െ ݎሻሽΤ  (4) 
and the condition of incentive compatibility for niche-product development as, 
ܷ݊ ൐ ܷ݉ ֞ ܾܵ ൐ ܵ݃ െ ߚሺܨ݉ െ ܨ݊ሻ ሺ݌ െ ݍሻሼߙ ൅ ሺͳ െ ݎሻሽΤ  (5) 
The condition of individual rationality for complementors is that the utility of investment on this platform 
exceeds that of investment on the other platforms. In the case of the other MSPs, there are both mass-product 
development and niche-product development. Thus the utilities that this MSP offers to complementors should 
be superior to that provided by the other MSPs. 
Um’ is set as the utility of mass-product development on the other MSPs and Un’ as that of niche-product 
development on the other MSPs. If Um and Un are superior to both Um’ and Un’ simultaneously, 
complementors must invest in the product development on this MSP rather than the other MSPs. Thus we can 
express the conditions of individual rationality as shown below. 
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ܾܵ ൒ െ݌ܵ݃ ሺͳ െ ݌ሻ ൅ ሺܷ݉ᇱ ൅ ߚܨ݉ሻ ሼߙ ൅ ሺͳ െ ݎሻሽΤΤ  (6) 
ܾܵ ൒ െݍܵ݃ ሺͳ െ ݍሻ ൅ ሺܷ݊Ԣ ൅ ߚܨ݊ሻ ሼߙ ൅ ሺͳ െ ݎሻሽΤΤ  (7)
 
3.2.2. The investment inducing domain to each development project 
Using the model that I explained so far, I illustrate the method that MSP operators induce complementors’ 
investment behavior to desirable way. 
Complementors would select the investment type according to the expected sales combination of Sg and 
Sb (Figure. 2). However MSP operators couldn’t control the expected sales combination of both successful 
project and failed project, but they could change cost structures of complements’ development to some extent. 
For example, initial development cost would be changed by license fee of the developer contract or the price 
of software development kit and the system needed, and variable cost would be controlled by the rate of 
commodity charge or product package style (such as disk media or ROM cartridge or digital data) and 
distribution channel. MSP operators move the intercept of incentive compatibility upper and lower by 
controlling the cost structure of complementors. Then they lead complementors’ behavior to desirable type. 
MSP operators slide the intercept of incentive compatibility higher to lead complementors investment to 
mass-product type project, and slide that lower to lead complementors investment to niche-products type 
project. There are two options to control the cost structure. One is adjusting the difference between the fixed 
costs of mass-products “Fm” and that of niche-products “Fn”. The other is adjusting the rate of variable cost 
“r”. According to this analysis, I could state two propositions about the relationship between the cost structure 
and the complementors behavior as listed below. 
 
Proposition 1: If complementors should invest a large amount of fixed cost in niche-product project and 
the variable cost rate would be high simultaneously, complementors will choose the investment in 
developing mass-products. 
Proposition 2: If complementors should need small amount of fixed initial cost for niche-product 
development and the variable cost rate would be relatively low simultaneously, complementors will choose 
the investment in developing niche-products. 
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Fig. 2. Conditions for each type of project 
3.3. The change of expected sales combination accompanying the progress of the product lifecycle stage 
The combination of expected sales of successful project and failed project and expected external cost factor 
would be changed because of the competitive environment shift led by the progress of MSP’s product 
lifecycle. This causes the moral hazard problem between MSP operators and complementors. I’ll describe 
those phenomena below. 
Firstly I’ll watch the shift of expected sales combination. As being shown in figure 3, the complementors 
would expect sales of both successful project and failed project to be very low at the introduction stage. At the 
next stage, the complementors expect those of both successful project and failed project to be relatively high 
because of the hidden risk by rapid growth of complements’ market, thus the combination of expected sales 
gets closer to the 45 degrees line. But in the mutuality stage, oligopoly of the complementors and their 
distribution channels makes the expectation of failed project sales much lower than that of successful project. 
Thus the combination of expected sales goes away from the 45 degrees line. From this consideration I could 
induce the third proposition as below. 
Proposition 3: Because the complementors estimate the risk of failure higher both in the introduction 
stage and in the mutuality stage than in the growth stage, the combination of expected sales of successful 
project and failed project is near to the origin at the introduction stage, then it moves to upper right getting 
closer to the 45 degrees line at the growth stage, and it goes away from the 45 degrees line to lower right. 
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Fig. 3. The shift of expected sales combination  
Secondly I’ll examine the change of external cost factors. Generally the development cost of both mass-
products and niche-products is relatively high because of the technological uncertainty at the introduction 
stage. The difference of development cost between mass-products and niche-products is getting wider through 
the progress of lifecycle of MSP because of the vanishing technological uncertainty. On the other hand both 
mass-product development cost and marketing cost become huger through the progress of lifecycle of MSP 
because of the intensive competition between complementors and the bargaining power of complements’ 
distributers. Thus the condition line of incentive compatibility (formula 6 and 7) becomes higher both in the 
introduction stage and in the mutuality stage, but becomes lower in the growth stage. From this examination I 
could induce the fourth proposition as below. 
 
Proposition 4: Because of the vanishing technological uncertainty the niche-product development cost 
condition line of incentive compatibility goes down in the growth stage, then intensive competition between 
complementors and their distributers causes a rise of both mass-product development cost and marketing 
cost, thus the condition line goes up. 
3.4. The moral hazard caused by the expected profitability 
Because of the gap of intention between MSP operators and complementors, the moral hazard problem 
would occur throughout the progress of product lifecycle, and then the indirect network effect between 
platform product and its complements would vanish (Table 1).  
As Moore [12] has stated, high-tech goods market tends to encounter the chasm between the introduction 
stage and the growth stage. Thus in the introduction stage, an MSP operator would expect complementors to 
attend its ecosystem and develop niche-products that would expand the complements market by trial-and-
error of new approach, in order to cross the chasm. But complementors would hesitate to attend the ecosystem 
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because of the uncertainty, or even if they attend the market, they tend to invest in the mass-product type 
project because they would expect both sales of successful project and failed project to be low, and because of 
the difference between the development cost of mass-products and that of niche-products. This conflict causes 
the insufficiency of indirect network effect in the introduction stage. 
At the next growth period, an MSP operator expects complementors to develop high quality mass-products 
that would be purchased by new and inexperienced customers with no uncertainty in order to expand its 
ecosystem. However complementors tend to invest in relatively low cost niche-product type projects because 
they expect the sales would be acceptable, even if the project ends in failure. This conflict causes the problem 
of “bad money drives out good” in the growth stage. 
At the last period of maturity, an MSP operator expects complementors to invest in the niche-product type 
project in order to expand its ecosystem by widening the complements’ variety and categories. On the other 
hand complementors tend to invest in the mass-product type project because of the declining expectation of 
failed project sales, and because of the rise in both marketing and product developing cost. This conflict 
causes the insufficient indirect network effect that is led by mannerism of complements. 
From the examination above, I could induce the fifth proposition as below. 
 
Proposition 5: The shift of expected profitability of complements, which is led by the competitive 
environment change throughout the MSP’s product lifecycle, causes the undesirable type development of 
complements for MSP operators, thus the crisis of multi-sided market failure would be triggered. 
Table 1. Conflict between an MSP operator and complementors 
Product lifecycle Desirable investment for a 
MSP operator 
Desirable investment for 
complementors 
Introduction Stage Niche-product Mass-product or not 
entering this ecosystem 
Growth Stage Mass-product Niche-product 
Maturity Stage Niche-product Mass-product 
4. Discussion about the cost structure which attracts desirable action 
As I mentioned before MSP operators could control the cost structure of developing complements. They 
could induce complementors’ investment to the desirable type product project by building the cost structure 
appropriately. 
Firstly in order to induce complementors to invest in the mass-product type project, an MSP operator 
should not only make the difference of initial development cost between mass-products and niche-products 
small, but also make the variable production cost rate low. In short the high-risk and low-return cost structure 
could lead complementors to develop mass-products. The cost structure of Nintendo’s Super Family 
Computer System could be given as this example. Nintendo provided expensive software developing system 
for its platform and forced complementors to produce large initial production lot. Thus complementors 
selected their product developing investment carefully for promised mass-product type project. 
Secondly in order to induce complementors to invest in the niche-product type project, an MSP operator 
should not only make the difference of initial development cost between mass-products and niche-products 
large, but also make the variable production cost rate high. In short the low-risk and low-return cost structure 
could lead complementors to develop niche-products. The cost structure of Apple’s iOS application could be 
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given as this example. Apple provided low cost software development system to software developers. On the 
other hand they charged 30% usage fee for software sales. 
But the rigidity of pricing policy that Nakata [10] pointed out makes the MSP operators’ decision on 
pricing complicated. The pricing structure tends to be stable not only because the structure sometimes 
depends on the technology they choose, but also because the stability is needed to keep complementors 
support for their platform. The uncertainty of price structure makes the expected profitability of developing 
complements, thus it might lead complementors to invest in alternative platform’s projects. However because 
the rigidity of pricing policy leads moral hazard problem in the next stage of MSP’s product lifecycle, 
sometimes platform leaders who once held the de-fact standard position would be overcame by new entries. 
5. Conclusion 
I discussed the mechanism of moral hazard problem between an MSP operator and its complementors in 
this paper and built the model that the expected profitability change of developing complement works as the 
shift of incentive compatibility condition, and then leads the failure of multi-sided market. In order to avoid 
this problem an MSP operator should build low-risk and low-return cost structure for complementors both at 
the introduction stage and at the maturity stage of MSP’s product lifecycle and should build high-risk and 
high-return cost structure at the growth stage. However because the rigidity of pricing policy exists, an MSP 
should build neutral policy mix toward the progress of MSP’s product lifecycle. The information of consumer 
reviews and sales ranking, provided by Amazon or Apple, could be given as an example of this solution. 
Apple’s cost structure of iOS application would easily lead both exceeded variety and poor quality of 
complement, but their regulation for launching software and the information of consumer review and sales 
ranking reduce the uncertainty of product quality, then Apple can avoid the market failure of its App Store at 
the moment. 
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